Instability and Competition: Shedding Light on NATO’s Southern Flank

Alessandro Vitiello: While acknowledging the critical importance of the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, several NATO members are also concerned about instability on the southern flank. Does this preoccupation stem from the fact that NATO has long lacked a coherent, long-term and updated strategy for its southern region?

Elio Calcagno: There is no doubt that many of NATO’s southern members are primarily concerned with those threats they perceive as more immediate to their security interests. In the case of the southern Allies, instability in the MENA region is understood to have clear repercussions on their own stability, mainly through illegal migration flows. Meanwhile, the Yemeni conflict’s spillover into the Red Sea and its effects on maritime trade in the Mediterranean region have demonstrated another possible vulnerability.

Yet, NATO is a defensive alliance made up of a variety of countries, each with its own threat perception. In such a context, unity depends on common intents, which, in turn, depend largely on a shared understanding of which threats are to be prioritised or which are threats at all. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has contributed massively to the Alliance again finding a commonly understood state-based threat, which is existential for those eastern members closer to Russia and that even the most sceptical Allies cannot deny.

Therefore, whereas the northern and eastern flanks are characterised by a clear-cut state-based threat, the southern flank’s main discernible threat, on which almost everyone can agree, is the concept of instability, its wider consequences, and how it can be exploited by adversaries. To be sure, in recent years, Chinese and Russian influence in this macro-region has become increasingly obvious – often to the detriment of western influence – but this has not led to a consolidated NATO approach to the problem.

Nevertheless, concern over instability along the southern flank is nothing new, and it is likely to continue even as Russian aggression and posturing take the lion’s share of NATO resources.

AV: However, recent developments indicate a partial shift. At the 2023 Vilnius summit, NATO members pledged to conduct a thorough assessment of existing and emerging threats from the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood. In May 2024, NATO published the final report from a team of independent experts who reviewed the Alliance’s posture towards this region. This resulted in the 2024 Washington Summit introducing a strategic action plan and the official position of NATO Special Representative for the Southern Flank. What factors are driving this evolution?

EC: NATO is conscious of the fact that it needs to attempt to cater to all of its members’ security concerns. Southern flank instability, especially through massive migration flows as a direct consequence, has had disproportionate destabilising effects at the political level both in the national, bilateral, and EU contexts. There is also a widespread understanding that Russia and China are entering and exploiting a void left by western countries – especially in Africa – by promoting anti-western rhetoric and, in the Russian case, further instability. It should not be surprising then that NATO is looking to take a more coherent stance on the southern flank.

AV: Despite NATO’s southern flank having such a strategic significance, challenges are many and resources are limited. Why should Allies outside the region, such as the Baltic states, in particular, consider it relevant as opposed to diverting resources away from strengthening the eastern flank or assisting Ukraine?

EC: Resource scarcity and the immediate threat posed by Russia on the continent are only some of the main obstacles to a well-defined and effective approach to the south. We have seen how issues relating to illegal migration flows from and through the MENA region have had (and continue to have) detrimental effects on European unity and the process of EU integration, often leading to bilateral disputes, for example, between France and Italy. Moscow has taken note of this and weaponised migration flows from Belarus into Poland in the months leading to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a hybrid warfare tool against the EU.

I do not believe that Baltic Allies, by and large, see southern flank instability as an irrelevant threat. They certainly, and understandably, sense an existential threat coming from much closer to home. Given the efforts that the larger southern Allies like Spain and especially Italy have put in recent years into strengthening NATO’s presence along its eastern flank – by providing troops to (or even leading) NATO battlegroups and taking part in the NATO Air Policing mission – blocking the push for more NATO activity in the south would be a politically untenable position. It is important that Allies to the north and the east recognise the efforts of countries on the other side of Europe to NATO’s posture by being open to a more active approach to the south.

It is undeniable, however, that resources are indeed scarce – not least considering that many countries did not fully meet NATO’s spending requirements before February 2022 – and that defence budgets are generally rising, though amid stagnant economic growth.

AV: Is it, then, possible to ensure that NATO’s engagement in the south is reconciled with its pivotal focus on the east? Should NATO consider “its southern and eastern flanks as interconnected geopolitical spaces”?[ii]

EC: This interconnection is well-understood though it still points to a crucial difference between the southern flank on one side and the eastern and northern flanks on the other. The threats are different, as are the tools required to face them. To be sure, Russian submarines threatening NATO shipping in a conflict scenario would be a conventional threat to be dealt with in a specific way. But when it comes to instability and its exploitation by Moscow and other players, battlegroups as configured along the eastern flank are of little use. This is the reason why the Washington Summit Declaration, when it turns its attention to the “southern neighbourhood,” focuses mainly on tools such as dialogue, outreach, and visibility and not on deterrence-related instruments.

This is another reason why a more active NATO in the south does not have to take away important resources from the Alliance’s posture and conventional deterrent, at least as long as it develops along these lines.

AV: However, it seems that the Allies do not share the same perspective on the southern flank, or even on NATO’s overall mission and scope. What is the rationale behind the positions of key NATO members involved in the southern region, such as Italy, Turkey, and France?

EC: This is, in my opinion, the crux of the issue. There are three main problems when we try to condense a multitude of views from Allied capitals into a coherent view vis-à-vis the south. Firstly, there is a wide range of often-contrasting views as to what the most important threats are and how they should be dealt with. For instance, Libyan instability has been a thorn in the side of Europe for over a decade now. Even neighbours such as France and Italy have had deeply contrasting views on the matter, with experts and stakeholders in Rome still uneasy about Paris’ (and other Allies’) approach to the conflict and its aftermath. Turkey, another heavyweight NATO member, has also played a prominent role in the Libyan crisis in opposition to other Allies, even violating the EU arms embargo on Libya in order to supply General Haftar’s forces. NATO’s Mediterranean Allies have clear and immediate interests in the southern neighbourhood, which only enhances the potential for disagreements and rivalries. In these conditions, bringing issues such as Libya into NATO risks undermining unity where unity is a crucial factor in a credible deterrent.

Secondly, it is not always clear that southern NATO members have a well-defined idea of what it is exactly that the Alliance should do in the southern neighbourhood that it is not already doing. As I work in Rome my analysis is inevitably formulated through an Italian lens, and my sense is that beyond regular calls for NATO not to ‘forget about the south,’ there has historically been little in the way of concrete proposals for new initiatives or tools. Most importantly, we have not always seen the type of proactive leadership needed in order to rally support within the Alliance toward concrete actions that depart from the traditional approach. There is likely room for one or more Allies to stand out and really become the voice and hands of NATO in this region, leading by example and showing the Alliance where it should bring to bear its limited resources.

Thirdly, and finally, some NATO Allies wish to keep NATO out of their interests around the Mediterranean so as to avoid an unwanted overlap with their own national policies in the region. This is likely the case for Turkey and France, who already operate within well-defined strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region.

AV: Italy has played a significant role in pushing for a greater focus on the Mediterranean, including advocating for the introduction of a NATO Special Representative for the southern flank. However, recent statements from Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg indicate that this position is likely to be assigned to Spain. During a recent interview, Italian Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto sharply criticized this decision as “nearly a personal affront,” suggesting it was a vendetta against Italy. Furthermore, Minister Crosetto questioned Stoltenberg’s impartiality, accusing him of failing to remain super partes. What are the implications of this development?

EC: I do not know what exactly happened behind the scenes, but this is not the first time Italy has failed to obtain a prominent position in a multilateral organisation that it believed it deserved, be it NATO or the EU. There is, in my view, a structural problem due to the country’s political and institutional fragmentation. For this reason, it is often very difficult for Rome to come up in a timely manner with strong candidates for specific positions which would generally be attainable for a country like Italy. Such struggle sometimes even results in multiple Italian candidates – none of whom enjoys full national support as a consequence – competing for one position, even against one another.

Indeed, Italy has for decades suffered from a degree of underrepresentation within NATO: the last Italian Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, finished his mandate in 1971, while Rome has not provided a Deputy Secretary General since 2012. The nomination of Adm. Cavo Dragone as the incoming Chair of the NATO Military Committee is a welcome break from this trend, but it must signal a new beginning rather than a positive exception.

Time will tell what repercussions this debacle will have on NATO-Italy relations, but Rome has to find a solution to a problem that transcends specific governments and extends far beyond the position of special representative for the southern flank.

AV: You helped us understand that, while awaiting the appointment of a new secretary-general, the Allies continue to maintain a diverse range of positions and strategies regarding the southern flank, its critical threats, and the Alliance’s role in the region. What can we expect for the future of NATO’s southern agenda?

EC: I personally do not expect a radical change in NATO’s southern agenda, at least in the short term. As long as Russia remains an immediate threat, most of NATO’s resources and attention will be focused away from the southern neighbourhood. The most recent commitments still focus on dialogue, outreach, and capacity building, meaning that there is no real departure from existing policies. Not to mention that in this area NATO likely has to find a complementary modus operandi with the EU, who by and large has the more appropriate instruments at its disposal to foster and safeguard stability and is increasingly showing the willingness to switch to a more hands-on approach.

This article was written for ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).

[i] 2024 NATO Washington Summit Declaration

[ii] Atalan, Y. (2024) “The Future of NATO’s Southern Flank.” CSIS, July 10^th 2024.