ECFR: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

The return of Donald Trump’s “America first” policies, and the US President’s unilateral approach to international relations, has upended the way Europe views the Transatlantic Alliance, according to a new multi-country survey report – ‘Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump’  – published today by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

• Multi-country survey of 11 EU member states, plus Ukraine, including Estonia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, finds unity in preparing Kyiv for peace negotiations – but divisions around a common approach to Ukraine and Russia, post-conflict.
• The report identifies a shift in opinion about the US following Trump’s return to the White House – with Washington now seen as a “necessary partner”, rather than an “ally”, by most in Europe. The study also surveys attitudes towards China and Russia.
• Findings suggest the new Trump administration could have room to pit Europeans against each other on key issues. European leaders will need to prepare, and – when necessary – stand ready to bargain, the report states.
• In their analysis, co-authors and foreign policy experts, Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli and Pawel Zerka, note that European leaders should reconcile to the fact that there are looming divergences between EU and United States – and that Europe would be best placed to embrace pragmatism in response to the unilateral ambitions of Washington.
• ECFR will host a webinar on 12 February 2025 (14.00 – 15.15 CET) to explore the findings of this poll, featuring the three authors of the report. You can find more details about this event and RSVP to attend here.

The poll, which comprises public opinion data from 14 countries, including Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine, Switzerland, and the UK, reveals most EU citizens now view the United States as a “necessary partner” (50%, as an average across 11 EU countries polled), rather than an “ally” (21%), which creates an opening for a more “pragmatic” and “transactional” approach across global issues. In the case of Estonia, 55% see the US as a “necessary partner”, and 28% view the US as an “ally” that shares its interests and values.

ECFR’s study also finds differing opinions about the scale and shape of EU engagement with China, with respondents in countries of Southern and South-Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Spain and Italy exhibiting a more positive view of the Asian giant compared to European economies further West or North: especially Denmark and Germany where majorities view China as either a rival or an enemy of the EU. A similar story of division is visible on the subject of Ukraine, too. While Europeans are largely united in expecting peace negotiations, views on what those negotiations should entail and how they should conclude vary greatly, in ways European leaders must heed if Trump increases the pressure for talks.

In their analysis, the report’s authors, ECFR senior fellows and foreign policy experts Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli and Pawel Zerka, argue there is no reason to believe that Donald Trump has changed his opinion of the EU from his first term in office, in which he called it a “foe” and referred to Brussels as being “like a hellhole”. He and his administration stand opposed to Europe’s ambition for a green transition, its alleged “wokeism”, and its regulation of “free speech”, particularly around social media platforms.

The authors suggest Europeans should expect to face strategic, economic, and political challenges from the US President’s “America first” policies, and realise that interests between their two shores are increasingly diverging. In this new world, Europe will need to stand up, confront the crisis of confidence in its global influence, and deal with its many fault-lines in a pragmatic and creative way. To navigate this complex landscape, collaboration between its EU-optimistic and more pragmatic camps will be crucial, write Puglierin, Varvelli and Zerka. They believe opportunities for flexible cooperation between those that are willing and prepared to act together should be seriously considered. For instance, Germany, France, and Poland are already exploring new diplomatic formats, with Poland approaching the Nordic countries and the UK in what appears to be an intent to create a coalition of forces aimed at sustaining Ukraine’s war effort against Moscow.

Notwithstanding, they warn leaders will need to be careful not to precipitate the bloc’s fragmentation. There’s a thin line between pragmatic intergovernmentalism and a careless marginalisation of the EU institutions and processes. These formulas should support the role of the EU, not replace it, the authors write. Most importantly, individual national leaders must resist the temptation of establishing privileged relations with Trump, at the expense of other European allies, and instead focus on negotiating and approaching the alliance from a transactional point of view, they conclude.

Key findings from ECFR’s multi-country survey include:

• Europeans now see the US more as a “necessary partner”, than an “ally”, in a world of Trump 2.0. This is a prevailing view in every EU member state surveyed – including traditional transatlantic strongholds, such as Poland (45% “necessary partner” vs. 31% “ally”) and Denmark (53% vs. 30%) – that one-and-a half years earlier saw US primarily as an ally. Those most likely to view the US in this light are found in Ukraine (67% “necessary partner” vs. 27% “ally”); Spain (57% vs. 14%); Estonia (55% vs. 28%), Portugal (55% vs. 18%) and Italy (53% vs. 18%). Even in the United Kingdom, which boasts a “special relationship” with the United States, the prevailing view is “necessary partner” (44%) rather than an ally (37%).
• Europeans now believe peace negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow are imminent. Asked about the most likely outcome of the war, majorities or pluralities everywhere point to a “compromise settlement”, rather than Russia or Ukraine winning; this is also a prevailing view in every country polled. Even in the most hawkish countries like Estonia (where 52% think negotiated settlement is the most likely outcome), Denmark (55%), Poland (44%), or – going beyond the EU – the UK (49%), citizens appear to be reconciled with the prospect of peace negotiations That being said, Europeans in some countries are standing firm on the need to support Kyiv in continuing fighting so it can win back its lost territories. The view that this, rather than pushing for peace negotiations, should be Europe’s approach is most pronounced among respondents in Estonia (53%), Denmark (47%), Poland (40%), UK (38%), and Portugal (37%).
• While Europeans are united in expecting peace negotiations to happen, there are schisms between countries on the approach towards Ukraine and Russia post-conflict. 47% of French and 50% of Italians – whose governments have played a very positive role in supporting Kyiv in its fight for self-determination – struggle to recognise Ukraine as a European country. Meanwhile, many people in Bulgaria and Hungary view Russia as the EU’s ally or necessary partner – rather than its rival or adversary; these are also the only two countries polled where majorities consider Ukraine as at least equally responsible as Russia for the war continuing, in keeping with Moscow’s talking points. In contrast, Estonia rejects this perspective, with 67% viewing Russia as an adversary with which the EU is in conflict.
• There are divergences of opinion among EU member states on whether Trump’s return is a “good” or “bad” thing. This is particularly true between South-East Europe, where Trump’s ‘fan-club’ is most prominent, and his detractors in Northern and Western parts of the region. Those more likely to view Trump’s re-election as positive for Americans, their own country, and world peace include Hungarians (51%, 47%, 49%, respectively), Bulgarians (47%, 28%, 45%), and Romanians (43%, 32%, 45%). On the other end of the spectrum, 53% of citizens in Denmark think it will be “bad” for Americans, 66% for their own country, and 62% world peace, which is similar to views in the UK (53%, 54%, 58%), and Germany (48%, 64%, 55%). An average European is more likely to see the return of Trump as a “bad” rather than a “good thing” on each of the three accounts.
• Supporters of Europe’s far-right are Donald Trump’s biggest cheerleaders. Less than a fifth of Fidesz, PiS, Konfederacja and Brothers of Italy voters believe his re-election is a “bad thing” for American voters, their own country, or peace in the world. However, electorates of AfD and Rassemblement National stand out in having a plurality of voters (37% and 35%, respectively) who believe Trump’s return to power is a bad thing for their own countries; and fewer of them (28% and 20%, respectively) believing it’s a good thing for their countries.
• Europeans are divided on China and its relationship with the EU. While 43% of EU citizens see China as a “necessary partner” or “ally” for the EU, 35% perceive the superpower to be a “rival”, or even an “adversary”. China is seen in a positive light in Southern Europe. This is true in Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Romania, Italy, and Portugal – where 59%, 54%, 50%, 49%, 49%, 49% and 45% of respondents, respectively, see Beijing as a “necessary partner” or “ally”. This is also true in Estonia, with 43% seeing China as either an ally or a necessary partner. But in some other European economies, including Germany, Denmark, UK and France, most hold a counter view, with 55%, 52%, 45%, and 45%, respectively, seeing China as a “rival” or “adversary”.
• The report identifies four distinct groups of Europeans, on how they see the EU and its role in the world. “Euro-optimists” represent the largest camp (30% of respondents, on average, particularly salient in Estonia, Denmark, Ukraine, Spain and Portugal); they believe that the EU is a great power and that its collapse is unlikely within the next two decades. “Euro-pessimists” (22%) are composed by those believing the EU is not a power and is doomed to collapse; this attitude features prominently in the electorates of some of the most radical far-right or EU-sceptic parties – like AfD, National Rally, PiS, Konfederacja, Fidesz, and Vox – and constitutes at least a quarter of citizens in Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, alongside the UK and Switzerland. “Euro-realists” don’t think the EU is bound to collapse – even if they don’t see it as a great power either; they account, on average, for a sixth part (17%) of the EU population – being particularly big in Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and Germany. Finally, “Euro-mortalists”, believe the EU is vulnerable to collapse but, at the same time, view it as a great power comparable to the US or China. They account for 11% of the EU populations, on average, with particularly high numbers in Romania, Bulgaria, and Portugal.

Not all is gloom, the report notes, as scepticism about the EU’s potential may signify a realistic assessment of the EU’s internal limitations and the challenges lying ahead in a world of Trump 2.0. “As twilight settles over the transatlantic relationship and neither luminous boosterism nor the blackest fatalism offer viable ways forward”, the authors conclude, “the nuances of the Euro-realists and Euro-mortalists may help light that path. By drawing them together with those Euro-optimists most confident about Europe’s future, pragmatic leaders can build broad majorities in favour of concerted action.”

See for more on the survey and ECFR activities: Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump