Ants Kiviselg: Cracks in Western Unity are a Victory for Russia

The more united we are in the west—in both words and deeds—the shorter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine or western countries will be. If Moscow gets the impression it can achieve its political aims by military means, then unfortunately, the fighting in Ukraine will not stop, warns Colonel Ants Kiviselg, head of the Military Intelligence Centre of the Estonian Defence Forces in an interview with Merili Arjakas.

There has been noticeably more talk this year about the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine. This is largely because of promises made by Donald Trump, but also because both Russia and Ukraine have now been fighting a full-scale war for far longer and at greater cost than anyone expected three years ago. What is the Military Intelligence Centre’s assessment of Russia’s ability to continue the war at its current scale and hold out against Ukraine’s resistance?

Ukraine wants peace more than Russia does, because Ukrainian society is bearing the brunt of the war. But in the form currently being discussed in public sources, the ceasefire proposals would actually hold Ukraine back. The US wants to play a mediating role, but the Russian position has come through more clearly in the negotiations.

The fact that the conflict has dragged on and turned into a war of attrition has reduced Russia’s ability to keep fighting. If the war continues at the same rate of losses, then by the first half of 2026, we believe Russia will face serious difficulties in renewing or replacing its technical equipment. For example, Russia will definitely struggle to replace the 4 000 tanks destroyed by Ukraine. The recruitment of new soldiers is also putting the Russian government under financial pressure. If the war goes on, the Russian population will start to feel the effects much more acutely.

So ceasefire talks offer Russia a lifeline. The negotiations will most likely pursue not just Ukrainian territory but also arms control agreements, the restoration of US–Russia bilateral relations, the lifting of sanctions, and recognition of the occupied territories.

At the same time, it is clear that the Russians believe they can win a war of attrition. They are using delay tactics against President Trump, hoping the Americans will grow impatient—which would help Russia put more favourable ceasefire terms on the table.

In 2022, Russia made several miscalculations. It underestimated western unity and overestimated its own ability to end the war in a matter of weeks. Until this year, the west has remained fairly united in its messaging. Now that unity is starting to crack. It works strongly in Russia’s favour as Moscow has not given up on its original ambitions. Just remember that in December 2021, Russia issued ultimatums to the west in order to negotiate directly with the US—bypassing European countries—and reshape the security architecture in the region, including the deployment of NATO forces.

Although the Russian Federation has made some gains in Ukraine, it has not achieved a military outcome that would justify making demands of that magnitude. But politically, it has started to make headway, negotiating with the US as an equal. At least, that is how the Russian leadership sees it—and how it presents it to its people.

What should we in Europe be doing more of or differently?

Russia has always sought to negotiate from a position of strength. It benefits from dividing Europe, because it is much harder to talk with the EU as a unified actor. It also benefits from driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. From that perspective, Russia sees disagreements among western countries as a win and will do everything it can to deepen them—just as it has historically been adept at exploiting discord to strengthen its own position.

What matters to us is that Europe has remained committed to the values-based world order built after World War II: borders cannot be changed by force, and the sovereignty and voices of small states also matter. Europe does not want to send Russia the signal that those basic principles no longer apply.

The more united we are in the west—in our words and our actions —the sooner the Russian Federation’s aggressive behaviour will end. Vladimir Putin started this war, and he has the power to end it by telling his own people that victory has been achieved.

One explanation sometimes given for US policy is that it aims to prevent Russia and China from growing closer. But how reliable a partner is Russia for China?

I do not think the Russian Federation is a reliable partner for anyone. Russia uses China when it suits its interests and is prepared to drop that relationship the moment it sees an advantage—only to revive it again if there is something to be gained. We have seen time and again that agreements signed by Russia are not binding in their eyes.

How much of a headache does Ukrainian resistance in the occupied territories pose for Russia, and how does that factor into Moscow’s thinking on a ceasefire?

It is still a concern, but less than before. In the first two years of the full-scale war, resistance to Russia was strong. Local efforts, in both intelligence-gathering and direct attacks, supported a number of successful Ukrainian operations, such as the strike on the naval base in Sevastopol. To suppress resistance in the occupied territories, the Russian army has used heavy-handed tactics: curfews, searches, filtration camps, and other similar methods. Russia believes that a ceasefire would allow it to keep the borders sealed and limit active resistance—and it plans to continue repressing the civilian population to ensure that.

But it is not in full control. Russia has not been able to prevent the elimination of war criminals targeted deep inside its own territory, let alone the drone attacks. It would be rather naïve to think that in occupied Crimea—where pro-Ukrainian forces have more freedom of movement than they do in Moscow or St Petersburg—Russia could fully wipe out resistance. Still, as history shows and the war in Ukraine has once again confirmed, the Russian leadership has no concern whatsoever for ordinary citizens. A few losses among its officers will not slow down the machine.

What is Putin afraid of?

Putin and his inner circle are afraid of all kinds of public discontent, various demonstrations, revolutions. Whether it is in Belarus, Ukraine, or Georgia, they see these not as genuine public uprisings but as something orchestrated by western intelligence services. And if those revolutions succeed, there is always the risk that a similar hope could take root in Russia, sparking protest there, too.

They also fear the economic success of former Soviet republics—the development of free trade, entrepreneurship, and a noticeable rise in living standards within just a few years. If Russians begin to see that people in neighbouring countries can improve their lives under democratic conditions, that sentiment could spread at home and threaten the current elite and Putin’s inner circle.

After Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, Putin made a concerted effort to purge potential collaborators or sympathisers from his circle and the security structures. He has spent decades building his system and maintains a tight grip on it—so it is wishful thinking to expect Russia to change course significantly once he is gone.

How does Russia view NATO?

We are a border state, so we feel threatened when Russia conducts military exercises or masses troops nearby. We want as many Allied forces in our region as possible to deter Russia, but the Kremlin may see this as aggression. Historically, Russia has interpreted NATO enlargement and the growing presence of Allied forces as direct moves against it. According to its military doctrine, Russia may escalate a situation in order to de-escalate it—that is, strike first in the hope that a forceful blow will bring peace.

But the reality does not suggest that Russia sees NATO as a genuine security threat. When the full-scale war in Ukraine began, Russia virtually emptied its garrisons along our border—leaving only a small contingent of regulars and conscripts to hold the bases. The fear of NATO is a pretext the Kremlin uses to justify its massive military spending to the Russian people.

If Russia were to follow through with the military reform plan it announced at the end of 2022, this would mean a doubling of troop numbers near Estonia’s borders in the coming years. Does Russia have the resources—money and manpower—to make that happen?

When former defence minister Sergei Shoigu announced the reform, the plan was to expand the armed forces to 1.5 million personnel. For comparison, when the war in Ukraine escalated in 2022, the Russian military had about 600 000 troops. Since then, roughly 300 000 soldiers have been added or mobilised each year, so the Russian army now totals more than a million. They could reach 1.5 million in the next few years, using a mix of approaches—drafting more conscripts or assigning reservists to specific structures.

What concerns Russia is what to do with the 600 000–700 000 men currently fighting in Ukraine once the war ends. They are used to good pay, and most of them have committed war crimes. The Russian leadership understands that reintegrating combatants into civilian life would be extremely risky. So, they will likely be deployed elsewhere—whether in Africa or somewhere closer to us remains to be seen. Moscow is also considering veteran reintegration at home, but right now, there is no way to employ such a large number outside the military sector.

Russia’s military industry is running at full speed. It began ramping up in the summer of 2022, once it became clear that the war would not be short. Many Russians are now employed in defence-related work, so even a ceasefire would not allow the industry to shut down overnight without serious social fallout. It would make sense for them to start scaling back the defence sector over the next two to three years—but only once they have rebuilt their stockpiles. That, in turn, would require some sanctions to be lifted so that they can reboot their economy, develop their industry, and create alternative jobs.

How quickly could Russia redeploy part of its forces to the Baltic region after a frontline ceasefire in Ukraine?

Russia could relocate both personnel and military equipment within weeks or months. Their redeployment system relies heavily on rail transport, so if military transport is given priority, the speed would depend on the availability of rail echelons.

One of the Military Intelligence Centre’s tasks is to provide early warning of military threats. What signals do you monitor to assess Russia’s intent and capability to attack Estonia?

Estonia monitors military, political, and economic indicators to determine when Russian society, political leadership, or military might be prepared to carry out an act of aggression. The Military Intelligence Centre focuses primarily on military indicators: how many resources Russia has available in our region, whether those are ground forces, naval, or air units, etc. We also assess whether it might be possible for Russia to launch a small operation in the Baltic region or take a step further and initiate a large one involving Finland, Sweden, or Poland.

Russia is likely monitoring very similar indicators but may draw very different conclusions. For example, the west’s weak response to Georgia or the annexation of Crimea, its disregard for its own red lines in Syria, and the chaotic withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan all led Russia to conclude that the west had lost its appetite for military engagement. The Covid-19 pandemic did not help either, as European countries began setting up different border regimes and restricting movement in various ways, which undermined the perception of unity.

How are they interpreting these signals now?

If there is talk of the US potentially pulling troops out of Europe, Russia will see that as a win. After all, reducing US and NATO presence in Europe was one of the demands in Russia’s ultimatums in 2021. If it happens, Moscow will certainly read it as a victory. It also did not help that the Baltic states were not invited to the Ukraine defence coalition talks held in London—even though our heads of state spoke with Prime Minister Keir Starmer ahead of the meeting. Russia will likely conclude that a line has been drawn somewhere: who is on one side and who is on the other.

And the rhetoric from western leaders is not necessarily convincing either. Yes, we keep stressing unity—that we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes, with as much as it takes. But the Kremlin may look at those messages and wonder where the concrete results are. Promises that are unfulfilled or only partially met are seen as a sign of weakness: either Europe does not mean what it says, or worse—Europe is unable to provide Ukraine with the level of support it needs. The drawn-out debates about using Russia’s frozen assets or the restrictions on western weapons systems only fuel Russia’s hopes that our unity—and therefore support—will eventually crack.

As a soldier, what worries me most is that—as with any autocratic regime—the Kremlin is prone to miscalculation. The Russian Federation has already made several strategic mistakes. One was its belief that the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and victorious war that would allow it to expand its influence in Europe. Secondly, I also do not think they ever truly considered that Finland or Sweden might respond by joining NATO. Meanwhile, regime change in Syria has reduced Russia’s capacity to operate in the Middle East. And Russia’s failure or unwillingness to support its ally, Armenia, against Azerbaijan has diminished Moscow’s influence even within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

All this means that even if we do the right things here, they may be read very differently across the border. Right now, Moscow believes it is winning the war of attrition against Ukraine and the west—and given their broader track record, it would be naïve to think they would not want to challenge Europe or NATO next.

To some extent, Russia is already testing us through so-called “hybrid operations” —activities designed to strain the capabilities of western institutions and deepen divisions within our societies, while staying below the threshold of Article 5. What can we do to push back against this?

One solution is for western countries to respond firmly to crimes orchestrated in our countries by Russian security services — for example, by imposing long prison sentences. That would send a clear message that the money paid to people who carry out this “dirty work” is not worth the consequences. These court rulings also need to be made public and widely reported to shrink the recruitment pool.

Secondly, intelligence services need to share information about individuals involved in sabotage operations. The people who are caught and imprisoned are only the lowest level. Many are recruited from the criminal underworld—people with alcohol or drug problems. Some names of those who plan the operations and do the recruiting are known. We need to share that information to restrict their ability to travel and work outside the Russian Federation.

So, if the top decision-makers are in Russia, is it possible that the mid-level operatives could be based here?

Yes, the middle tier can be in Europe. In Estonia, for example, sabotage attacks have been carried out by individuals of foreign origin who are not necessarily Russian citizens. Russia’s ability to collect intelligence and conduct operations through its personnel has been hampered by western countermeasures, such as the expulsion of intelligence officers following the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. That is why they have been forced to rely more heavily on local intermediaries, who then hire people to do the dirty work.

This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).