Moldova Should Not Be Decoupled from Ukraine in EU Accession

Member states are currently considering putting Moldova ahead of Ukraine on the track to join the European Union. While the desire to secure Moldova’s EU trajectory ahead of parliamentary elections at the end of September is understandable, decoupling the country’s accession from Ukraine would at this moment in time be a strategic misstep for the EU.

Contrary to arguments that prioritise Moldova’s size or current political alignment, a joint accession process remains essential to ensuring consistency in the implementation of the EU’s enlargement policy and, most importantly, sustaining Ukraine’s existential battle for sovereignty.

Solidarity, Consistency, and Credibility

Decoupling Moldova from Ukraine would undermine EU solidarity at a critical geopolitical moment. Ukraine, bearing the brunt of Russian aggression since 2022, has sacrificed enormously in pursuit of the very European values Moldova also aligns with. To fast-track Moldova ahead of Ukraine could be perceived not as a reward for reform, but as a punishment for being on the front lines. At a time when the Ukrainian army is on the back foot and US President Trump seems ready to do a quick and dirty ‘peace’ deal with Putin, such a move risks deep resentment in Kyiv, could fracture unity with Chisinau, and is certain to again disillusion candidate countries in the Western Balkans.

Moldova and Ukraine are part of a merit-based process, and each determines the scope and pace of its reforms to align with the EU acquis. In this sense, the candidate countries are not coupled. ‘Decoupling’, then, is nonsense. The principle of due process excludes the idea that the EU gives candidates a fast track by waiving needs for compliance with the acquis. At this stage, both countries are vulnerable to the fragility of institutions as they face challenges to democratic processes and the rule of law.

Fast-tracking Moldova would further undermine the EU’s credibility as a values-based union, which has greatly suffered because of the double standards applied in responding to severe democratic backsliding and mass civil protests in Georgia and Serbia. The EU must be wary of hollowing out the merit-based principles of enlargement. Enlargement must be a reward for sustained reform, not an instrument of short-term political engineering.

Safeguarding Democracy

Unlike Ukraine, whose population has shown overwhelming and consistent support for European integration—reflected in both resistance to Russia and in sweeping anti-corruption and defence reforms—Moldova remains divided. The argument that Moldova’s pro-European parties should be shored up lest the meaningful reforms made over the past few years be lost glosses over deeper structural issues within Moldova’s democracy—including weak institutional checks and balances, an underresourced public administration, and public disillusionment with reform promises that have yet to deliver tangible improvements in daily life.

In supporting one political faction to prevent the rise of another, the EU would risk further alienating segments of Moldovan society that feel unheard or marginalised, thereby strengthening—not weakening—the appeal of anti-European forces in the long run. True democratic consolidation can be achieved not by manipulating political outcomes but by fostering resilience across the political spectrum, ensuring that reforms are institutionalised and supported broadly.

Rather than tipping the political scales, the EU should further invest in strengthening democratic institutions, supporting independent media, and promoting civic education. These efforts are essential to empowering Moldovan citizens to make informed choices and to safeguarding the legitimacy of the country’s democratic processes.

Doubling Down

In the face of formidable political disinformation and electoral interference from a party led by a criminal oligarch now in exile in Russia, who made a fortune out of the huge 2014 bank fraud, Moldova managed its presidential election and constitutional referendum well in 2024, according to the OSCE observation mission. The authorities have honed their strategic communications skills. As the country’s democracy remains extremely vulnerable to Russian-backed interference, it is crucial for the EU to double down on its support for the fight against disinformation and vote-buying to help the government in conducting genuinely free and fair elections.

If Moldova is pulled ahead of Ukraine not on merit but to secure a specific political outcome, it opens the door for EU governments with domestic or bilateral grievances to justify obstructing Ukraine’s accession progress under the guise of political expediency. Instead of providing rhetorical ammunition to hostage-taking member states like Hungary and Slovakia, the EU should push for bilateral disputes that are not grounded in the acquis to be settled outside the accession process.

At this stage in time, the EU should continue to support both Moldova and Ukraine—together, not apart. A joined-up approach to pre-accession symbolises a united front against Russian aggression and reaffirms the EU’s commitment to fairness, reform, and regional security.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).