October 3, 2025

Church is a Body of … State? How the Kremlin Wields Religion as a Weapon

Marek Kohv Head of Security & Resilience Programme

Russia utilises Orthodox Christianity—specifically the Moscow Patriarchate—for both domestic and foreign political influence. Conversely, it becomes convenient for Russian authorities to portray alleged ‘foreign incursions on Orthodoxy’ as assaults on the ‘Russian world’ and its worldview.

Domestically, this strategy employs recordings of President Vladimir Putin performing rituals during religious holidays, as well as Orthodox priests blessing soldiers and military equipment. Such actions are designed to instil in ordinary citizens the notion of the inherent connection between faith, church, and state. Abroad, however, the church’s value to the Russian regime is even greater.

The Russian Orthodox Church and its clergy have acted as narrative launderers, translating Kremlin talking points into religious language

Globally, Russian authorities have leveraged Orthodoxy to amplify their foreign policy objectives. In practice, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and its clergy have acted as narrative launderers, translating Kremlin talking points into religious language[1].

From Kremlin to Clergy

Against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, peace preaching appears particularly cynical, as the ROC participates in blessing the troops and their weaponry while encouraging the Russian population to support the conflict. Another defining feature of this ‘Christianity’ promoted by the ROC is an aggressive opposition to the rights of sexual minorities. Simultaneously, endorsing these narratives serves to legitimise Russian foreign policy, portraying Russia as the final bastion of ‘traditional’ Christian values.

When access to objective information and media is severely restricted for Russian citizens—and, recently, even the desire to access such information has been curtailed—it is understandable why support for the war persists and why local issues fail to generate politically transformative opposition. In light of Russian subversive activities, secular western societies’ perceptions of church–state relations or the church’s role in society are critically important, as the Kremlin skilfully exploits both.

In societies that value and protect religious freedom, it is often difficult for people to conceive that a church could be directly involved in promoting state policies or, even more so, in intelligence operations. Yet, Russian history demonstrates a very different practice. State–church collaboration, flourishing under Stalin, was initially intended to mobilise the population during the Second World War[2], and later became an effective intelligence platform both for monitoring citizens[3] and for exploiting western liberal perceptions of the Church’s societal role[4].

In the context of contemporary hybrid warfare, the ROC provides the Kremlin with a widely used form of plausible deniability. Russia relies on the perception that the Church cannot have a political agenda or links to intelligence services, and even when evidence of such links emerges, responsibility can be attributed to local parishes or individual clergy. This pattern is likewise evident in the recruitment of hybrid attack operatives, where ties to Russian intelligence are often difficult to establish and investigations are reduced to ordinary criminal activity. It is important to note that one objective of hybrid attacks is precisely to make them appear as random accidents or minor offences.

At the same time, influencing the Russian diaspora is a known objective of Russian intelligence[5], and the Church’s involvement is not only possible but intentional[6][7]. The diaspora, in particular, is targeted before and during elections in host countries.

The ROC and Moldovan Elections

The Moldovan Patriarchate formally reports to the Moscow Patriarchate, and its leadership is vocally critical of the European Union. However, dozens of local priests have aligned themselves with the Romanian Patriarchate’s Bessarabia Metropolis in protest against the ROC’s militarised policies[8]. Political agitation within the Church, therefore, predates the 2024 EU referendum and the 2025 elections.

Political agitation within the Church, therefore, predates the 2024 EU referendum and the 2025 elections

During the EU accession referendum, the Bessarabia Patriarchate accused pro-Moscow clergy of supporting the “No” campaign. Archbishop Marchel of Bălți and Fălești, hierarch of the Moldovan Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), was fined $200 for violating a law that prohibits religious representatives from campaigning for a specific candidate during election periods[9]. This was his second fine: the archbishop had previously been ordered to pay over $1 100 to two members of the LGBTQ+ community for “inciting discrimination based on sexual orientation” after describing LGBTQ+participants of the 2022 so-called Solidarity March as “sodomites,” “lost people,” and “sinners.”[10]

Moldova has long been a strategic focus for Russian influence operations, particularly for intelligence services, and the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 were of no exception. This time, intensive engagement with the religious community began in 2024, when local priests were invited to all-expenses-paid trips to Russia[11]. It is easy to understand why Russia might suddenly take such an interest in Moldovan clergy: it was later revealed that some were issued Russian debit cards, with regular, large cash transfers to follow. They were being paid to launch and maintain parish social media channels that disseminated anti-EU messages, promoted “traditional values,” and chastised “gay Europe.”[12] Nearly one hundred new parish Telegram channels appeared, warning Moldovans against alignment with the EU and amplifying pro-Russian political parties’ narratives[13]. Overall, Russian efforts were visible but, fortunately, did not alter electoral outcomes.

The ROC in Modern Warfare

Patriarch Kirill’s militarism has been thoroughly documented. Unfortunately, his positions influence not only the members of the ROC at home but also believers worldwide. His views on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine are as illogical as President Putin’s historical interpretations. His long speeches discuss Russia’s ‘special status’ and a ‘metaphysical struggle’ between Russia and the west[14]. The Patriarch routinely legitimises the Kremlin’s narratives and works as a force multiplier for mobilising the Russian population. These narratives include amplifying Russian propaganda concerning ‘Ukraine’s war on Christianity and the Orthodox Church’ that reaches (at times) uninformed western audiences.

The ROC media outlets broadcast documentaries that sacralise the conflict

Patriarch Kirill’s principal role has been to provide a sacred justification for the war. The ROC media outlets—such as Spas television channel—broadcast documentaries that sacralise the conflict, thereby also documenting the Church’s role in mobilising propaganda[15]. Several programmes have depicted Russian Orthodox priests using icons to protect infrastructure[16][17], as well as military units[18] and equipment[19] deployed to war. The visibility of the Church and the Patriarch in military broadcasts is striking. This strategy is unlikely to be coincidental: the Kremlin understands the limits of its influence over policy and individuals, and dying for the defence of faith and traditional values may outweigh the reluctance to die for Putin.

In Ukraine, the ROC operates under the guise of religion while actively supporting activities against the Ukrainian state and citizens. Ukraine’s Security Service has repeatedly uncovered networks linked to or directly coordinated by the ROC[20][21].

Russian Orthodoxy in Hybrid Warfare

Moscow seeks to influence all countries that support Ukraine or express negative attitudes toward Russia. When the Church is available as a tool in the hybrid toolbox, the Kremlin never shies away from exploiting it. All means—legal but mostly illegal—are utilised, with numerous cases in which Russian Orthodox clergy have been directly involved in intelligence or influence operations across Europe.

In 2023, Bulgaria expelled three individuals acting “in the name of religion:” Archimandrite Vassian, a prior of the Sofia Russian Orthodox Church, and two priests of the Church of St Nicholas of Myra. Bulgaria’s security service reported that the three had attempted to deliberately influence Bulgarian social and political processes in favour of Russian geopolitical interests. As to be expected, the Russian embassy in Sofia framed the incident as an attempt to disrupt human, social, and inter-church relations[22].

In 2024, Czechia expelled Archpriest Nikolai Lishtshenuk, head of the Czech Russian Orthodox Church, for “establishing an influence structure with the support of Russian state authorities and potentially threatening national security.” It is worth noting that Lishtshenuk served in various religious roles in Czechia since 2001.

In 2024, Estonia did not renew the residence permit of Metropolitan Eugeni (Valeri Reshetnikov), head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Estonian Orthodox Church, forcing him to leave the country. The Estonian Internal Security Service assessed that his activities posed a threat to national security[23]. The Police and Border Guard Board explained that Reshetnikov publicly supported the aggressor and did not alter his behaviour despite warnings.[24]

Tracking individuals associated with the ROC is often difficult because their activities are borderline and well-disguised. Moreover, national laws often limit the government’s engagement with religious organisations in ways that would be suitable for countering hostile intelligence operations.

The locations that ROC chooses for its churches abroad reveal a tendency to neighbour defence and security installations

The locations that ROC chooses for its churches abroad are quite conspicuous. This was the reason why a Russian church building in Västerås, Sweden, has received broad attention. The Nordic countries appear to be among the most strategically preferred areas, revealing a tendency to neighbour defence and security installations. Research by the Molfar Intelligence Institute[25], based on public sources, identified five additional Russian churches in Sweden—all in strategic locations well-positioned for intelligence operations. Five Russian churches were also found in Norway in areas that could raise questions for intelligence services. In Finland, Russian presence has been fairly routine, though in August 2022, the city of Turku closed the local Russian Orthodox congregation’s Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God, situated near the Pansio naval base of the Finnish coastal fleet. In East Helsinki, near Vuosaari port and a large power station, a smaller Russian Orthodox chapel was built in 2000. Finnish security services have reportedly monitored these locations. A similar pattern has been observed in the Netherlands, where churches have been appearing near government and defence facilities.

The Core Values

Religious freedom is a fundamental value, and Russian Orthodoxy is not inherently a marker of aggression. Yet the cases described above demonstrate how the Russian Orthodox Church, as an organisation, operates directly in support of the Kremlin. Western democracies must prevent their vulnerabilities from being exploited under the guise of religious freedom. To this end, European policymakers, officials, and intelligence agencies must both re-assess the perceived role of the church in society and review domestic legislation to ensure that religious freedom does not override the right to peace, when religious figures incite aggression. And above all, potential Russian financial networks enabling intelligence operations in the west must be curtailed.

[1] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2024.2387436#d1e119

[2] https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619509

[3] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/religion-under-secret-police-surveillance-interview-george-f-kennan-fellow-tatiana

[4] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89T01451R000200230001-8.pdf

[5] https://rs.gov.ru/en/activity/compatriots/

[6] https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=jil

[7]https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729430/EPRS_ATA%282022%29729430_EN.pdf

[8] https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/

[9] https://orthochristian.com/164244.html

[10] https://orthochristian.com/164244.html

[11] https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/