German turns to the Indo-Pacific: From Strengthening Bilateral Partnerships to Balancing China in Asia and Deterring Russia in Europe

Germany’s Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs embarked on a widely acclaimed journey to the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, the visits may seem to be a part of traditional German diplomacy. On the other hand, Berlin’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific have now become interconnected with balancing China, deterring Russia, and enhancing Europe’s security posture.

Johann Wadephul toured five states, aiming to strengthen alliances with Singapore, New Zealand, Tonga, Australia, and Brunei, as well as to intensify relations with ASEAN and the Pacific Island Forum. Security cooperation emerged as a key topic on the agenda: the minister reiterated that the Indo-Pacific region is central to German and European interests, with an emphasis placed on trade, the procurement of essential resources, and the diversification of supply chains.

Many Stops and Even More Priorities

In Singapore, Wadephul held a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies where he focused on the growing tensions in the region, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Singapore lies at a vital location at the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important trade routes. Being the shortest maritime corridor from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, with around 82 000 vessels annually moving goods through this tiny needle’s eye, its strategic importance to geopolitics is undeniable. In the event of a Taiwan contingency, Singapore and the US could close the Strait to Chinese trading vessels, thereby creating one of the most harmful chokepoints for China’s export-oriented economy.

For his next stop, Wadephul visited Tonga, an island nation that faces significant challenges with natural disasters and is thus reliant on Chinese financial aid. Tonga hedges between China and the west, including its like-minded partners in the region. On the one hand, Tonga secured Japanese Official Security Assistance in December 2025. On the other hand, it remains close to Beijing. Back in 2018, it joined the Chinese New Belt and Road Initiative. In November 2025, Tonga’s king visited China and invited new investments, even though the island was already heavily indebted. Wadephul stressed that the European Union needed to grow its presence in the region. He promised to address Tonga’s concerns about climate change and boost European financial support for the endangered island. For the EU, Tonga, although distant, is strategically important due to its seabed mineral resources. In the effort to diversify supply chains, especially in the natural resources sector, strengthening relations with the Indo-Pacific island state is critical.

After Tonga, Wadephul visited New Zealand and Australia, Germany’s long-standing partners. Berlin and Canberra agreed to extend their cooperation on importing critical raw minerals such as lithium. Wadephul also intends to revive talks on a free trade agreement between the EU and Australia that stalled in 2023. With China’s expanding influence, the enhanced cooperation between like-minded partners for the stability of the Indo-Pacific has become vital. Australia, too, has engaged in different forms of alignment aimed at maintaining regional balance, including AUKUS (Australia–UK–US), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia–US–Japan–India), and numerous (bilateral) defence and security agreements such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan.

In New Zealand, Wadephul urged to promote cooperation on Antarctica in order to preserve the integrity of the Antarctic Treaty system. Climate change is causing the polar caps to melt, which will, on the one hand, enable the extraction of valuable resources, such as oil and gas, while opening up a new area for geopolitical competition on the other, with countries filing for mining claims. China, in particular, declared itself to be a “state with Arctic interests” in 2018. Down in the South Pole, geopolitical interests will become increasingly visible as Antarctic temperatures continue to rise as well. Germany does not want the Antarctic to be a legal vacuum for the geopolitical ambitions of individual countries. Nor does it want to fall behind in this geopolitical race.

In Brunei, the discussion centred on deepening relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with Brunei being the Country Coordinator in ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations (2024–27). Wadephul endorsed a potential free trade agreement between the EU and ASEAN, as well as with individual countries, following the example of a deal signed between the EU and Singapore.

A Search For Partners, Old and New

Germany’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific is attributed to a difficult position it finds itself in as a middle power between three major powers: China, Russia, and the US. With Russia as a grave security threat, the transatlantic partnership in question, and an overreliance on trade with China, the need to diversify is as urgent as ever. The “China Shock,” a trade deficit, and a dependency on critical raw mineral supplies from China have put the German economy in danger. To de-risk, Berlin needs to search for new partners worldwide.

Germany’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific is attributed to a difficult position it finds itself in as a middle power between three major powers

In the meantime, Beijing has become increasingly assertive in its geopolitical ambitions, especially in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. A potential Taiwan contingency in the coming years is thus a real concern, and Germany, together with the EU, must prepare. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas was one of the critical factors as the member states were weighing the Union’s response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. An obvious lesson to learn from that would be to diversify trade in order to be able to impose sanctions on China without derailing European economies.

Germany for Europe or on its own?

Europe’s Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to solidify a rule-based international order and engage in multilateral cooperation and fair trade. Germany follows this course. The EU is entering a new phase, redirecting towards the Indo-Pacific and establishing new ties with partners in East Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. For that ambition to succeed, all member states have to get on board and actively pursue bilateral relations with their Indo-Pacific counterparts.

Germany and the EU have finally recognised that the security in the Indo-Pacific and European theatres are closely intertwined. And the partnership between China and Russia has significant repercussions for both.

The implications of Russia’s large-scale attack on Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific states were quite visible in the economy and trade. For instance, when Russia launched its military campaign to block Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea coast, the subsequent drop in Ukrainian wheat exports affected food security in smaller states in the Indo-Pacific. In the past, Moscow itself tried to reach out to the Indo-Pacific, having long viewed Southeast Asian countries as a future source of economic growth. With the efforts made already before 2022, Russia has recently focused on establishing bilateral partnerships in the region to mitigate the effects of sanctions introduced by the EU and the US. The fact that ASEAN members have largely avoided imposing sanctions on Russia and have used cautious diplomatic language does not mean the EU’s engagement is unlikely to succeed. On the contrary, ASEAN’s cautious stance reflects a desire to avoid taking sides, which creates political leeway, allowing the EU to offer economic partnerships and security cooperation as alternatives to excessive dependence on Beijing or Moscow. Germany’s goal, therefore, is to prevent further strategic alignment among Russia, China, and Southeast Asia.

Cutting the Chinese Economic Lifeline to Russia

China’s steady imports of approximately two million barrels of Russian oil per day are crucial for financial stability in Moscow. Energy exports remain Russia’s primary source of budget revenue, enabling the Kremlin to continue funding the military industry and enduring the war with Ukraine while offsetting the impact of western sanctions. As long as this source of state income remains intact, Russia can not only sustain its war effort in Ukraine but also maintain the combat readiness of its armed forces along NATO’s eastern flank. Therefore, limiting China’s economic support for Russia—such as a stricter enforcement of secondary sanctions on entities facilitating Russian oil experts—improves the long-term effectiveness of European policies and weakens Moscow’s strategic resilience.

Germany’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific can be considered not only as an effort to de-risk and constrain China but also to deter Russia from making further moves that jeopardise security in Europe

Russia’s ability to maintain high levels of military spending, as well as finance and conduct hybrid operations throughout Europe, depends on the viability of its external economic lifelines. As long as Chinese energy purchases and dual-use exports continue to bolster the Russian economy, Moscow will retain the means to apply long-term pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and beyond. Therefore, European and German involvement in the Pacific region is not insignificant for the security of the Baltic states.

Countries from Europe to Asia are looking towards the Indo-Pacific region in search of new partnerships. Germany’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific can be considered not only as an effort to de-risk and constrain China but also to deter Russia from making further moves that jeopardise security in Europe. Germany’s approach aligns with what the EU and its like-minded partners in Asia, such as Japan, have been doing for years now.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).